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 Ethical and Social Concerns: Opinions of Japanese Life-Science Researchers on Developments 




Because of its importance to society, the science of mind and behavior is an academic field in 
which ethical and social considerations are vital. When examining these issues, the opinions of 
life-science researchers must be considered. In this article, the authors elicit and describe the 
opinions of sixty-one Japanese life-science researchers on the ethical and social issues 
surrounding the science of mind and behavior. The results reveal significant diversity of 
opinions, especially when the subject was the genetic “enhancement” and “medical treatment” 
of human mental abilities. Moreover, there was a lack of consensus regarding the application of 
mind and behavior research to social policy. The results suggest that a wide range of life-science 




The science of mind and behavior has grown enormously in recent years (Plomin and Oliver 
2009). Combining insights from neuroscience, psychological science and life science, this 
interdiciplinary field hopes to elucidate the genetic aspects of human behavior, mind, and 
personality (Butcher et al. 2008; British Medical Association 2007; Loat et al. 2008; Galaburda 
et al. 2006; O’Mathúna 2006; Tang et al. 1990). Many of the research topics addressed by the 
science of mind and behavior, including autism spectrum disorders and other 
neurodevelopmental disorders, are expected to contribute greatly to human welfare (Interagency 
Autism Coordinating Committee 2010).  
Mind and behavior research does, however, occasionally elicit serious concerns about 
its ethical and social implications (Duster 2006; Foster and Sharp 2007; National Center for 
Human Genome Research 1996; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002). There is compelling 
evidence that behavioral genetics, a core research area, has a strong influence on society. 
Because its focus is on the differences among certain groups, social reactions should be 
carefully taken into account. At times, while researching this topic, one flushes out the specter 
of eugenics. In conjunction with social policies, eugenics programs have reshaped society 
through such things as the involuntary sterilization of those with mental disabilities (Kevles 
1985).  
 Today, the life sciences are increasingly able to intervene both directly and indirectly 
into the human mind and behavior. This field is becoming more influential, with increasing 
potential to elucidate the genetic influences on human behavior. Thus, it is important to consider 
the ethical and social impacts of the life sciences of mind and behavior, both in the present and 
looking into the future (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002; Rothstein 2005).  
Much of the recent research in this area has addressed issues such as criminal behavior, 
sexual tendencies, alcoholism, aggressiveness, psychological disorders, and cognitive 
disabilities. Important but controversial technologies—including genetic testing, selective 
abortion, and the enhancement of cognitive and intellectual abilities—can be applied in 
conjunction with the fruits of such research (British Medical Association 2007; Fisher and 
Francks 2006; Kovas and Plomin 2006; Posthuma and de Geus 2006; Xu et al. 2008). Such 
fruits are closely linked to cultural representations and social images, which can have a negative 
effect on a specific population. And the legal responsibilities of people born with cognitive 
disabilities can be ambiguous and controversial (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002). This 
combination of factors has led a number of researchers to argue that society is coming to regard 
issues relating to mind and behavior research as important (Adams 2004; Baoutina et al. 2008; 
Fenton 2008; Marcum 2008).  
 Ensuring that scientific knowledge and technology contribute to human welfare is a 
difficult but important problem; one must consider both the scientific and the cultural factors 
(Epstein 2007). In many cases there are no simple and precise answers to the question of interest. 
For example, consider the possibility of intervening in memory function, anecdotally said to 
improve human wellbeing considerably. On one hand, research in that area can assist patient 
recovery. However, simply enhancing the ability to retain all information would clearly have 
negative impacts on selectivity, an important part of the human memory system. In addition to 
scientific issues of this nature, we must also consider the social impacts of mind and behavior 
research. Should memory improvement be performed on a “normal” person? Would it truly be 
beneficial (British Medical Association 2007)? Even if we ignore the benefits and detriments for 
an individual human life or an entire society, determining the full consequences of memory 
enhancement is extremely complex and depends on the time, place, and individual involved 
(Cunningham-Burley 2006).  
From all this one may conclude that the time is ripe to examine the social and legal 
implications of progress in mind and behavioral science; a survey of researchers is essential. 
Though the field is large and varied (Schaffner 2006a, b), few have participated in discussions 
aimed specifically at eliciting ethical and social concerns (Adams 2004). The situation is 
 especially dire in Japan, one of the leaders in the life sciences.  
For the present study, we interviewed sixty-one front-line Japanese life-science 
researchers. Our aim was to examine and clarify opinions concerning important ethical and 
societal issues raised by the sciences of mind and behavior. We focused primarily on 
intervention into the genetic basis for human behavior, a much debated topic. Our findings may 
serve as a basis for ongoing discussions between life-science researchers and members of 
Japan’s wider society. 
 
2. Methods 
Interviewer: All interviews were carried out by a Japanese graduate student with a background 
in both the life sciences and the social sciences. 
 
Subjects: Sixty-one life-science researchers (fifty-six male, five female) were interviewed. This 
study focused on not only the opinions of “opinion leaders” (i.e., prominent researchers who are 
active participants in debates on the ethical and social aspects of the study of mind and 
behavior) but other representative researchers. All of the participants worked in fields that 
depended on mice for their findings (they studied mouse genes, mouse models, mouse cells, and 
behavioral phenotypes; see below). We selected researchers working with these mice for several 
reasons: they are the primary experimental mammal in the life sciences, the experimental 
technology developed to study them is quite sophisticated, and they bear a certain genetic 
resemblance to humans. This guaranteed a large pool of front-line researchers to choose from. 
Furthermore, there is a substantial amount of mouse-related life-science research that potentially 
relates to the genetic “enhancement” of humans (Tang et al. 1999).  
We used a method similar to purposive sampling to select our interviewees as follows. 
First, we divided academic disciplines into small categories according to such traits as research 
topics and methods. Then we made up lists of potential candidates from each research topic, 
using the proceedings of conferences and meetings related to various disciplines. Candidates 
were then selected from the lists based on the number of research papers they had published, 
their area of research, gender, academic position, and location. All of those selected had 
published more than three peer-reviewed academic papers and held academic positions 
(predominantly associate and full professors). Most lived in the Kansai and Kanto areas of 
Japan, where Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Kobe, and Kyoto are found—lively areas both 
economically and scientifically. By means of email, we invited ninety-one researchers to 
participate in our study; sixty-eight responded favorably, and from this group we selected 
 sixty-two people for formal participation. In addition, without considering their academic 
position we also included two researchers who were recommended by participants. Ultimately, 
we excluded three of the respondents because they had failed to answer core questions (see 
below). 
 
Interview: Interviews were carried out between July 2005 and December 2007. We used a 
semi-structured format. Each interview lasted an average of ninety minutes and consisted of a 
set of core questions, which were asked in varying orders. To capture the subjects’ opinion, the 
language used during interviews was tailored to their vocabulary and area of expertise. All 
interviews were conducted in Japanese. The first language of all participants was Japanese, 
except one individual who reads and writes Japanese proficiently. Core questions focused on the 
relationship between life sciences of mind and behavior and society, and the development of 
genetic technologies affecting human mental activities. These questions were combined with 
others that aimed to elicit the respondents’ opinions on research employing mouse models and 
the transmission of information from life scientists to society (Higashijima et al. 2008; 
Higashijima et al. 2009a; Higashijima et al. 2009b). Due to time constraints, some respondents 
were not able to answer all of the questions. 
The procedure was also modified during the interviewing period: we decided to cease 
making tape recordings out of concern that the presence of the recorder might distort opinions. 
 
Analysis: While analyzing our data, we tried to clarify the differences in opinions expressed by 
various respondents in detail, though it was difficult to compare and examine every opinion. 
Therefore, we have classified the opinions, using a percentage of the respondents as a rough 
guide to general trends: small differences were not considered quite meaningful in our analysis.  
For analysis, each data set was first categorized according to its contents. For some 
questions, respondents were shown a number of options to choose from (ex. 
positive/negative/others) and then asked to explain their choice. Data were then classified again 
by two graduate students who assigned 0.5 points to every answer that corresponded with a 
relevant item on the category list. During this process, the list was refined several times to 
reflect important aspects of the data. The sum of the points assigned to each item on the list was 
divided by the number of respondents (giving a modified percentage of respondents). Thus, if 
approximately 85 percent of respondents who had talked about something concerning item A 
had answered “A,” that item was assigned a figure of 85.  
In order to measure inter-coder reliability, we calculated the percentage of agreement 
 (Francisco et al. 2006). If the agreement percentage was 95 percent, the classifiers’ agreement 
with respect to answer scoring was 95 percent as well.  
Some respondents commented on existing Japanese laws and guidelines regarding 
research environments. Because these answers were irrelevant to our questions, they were put 
into the “other” category.  
Because of the scoring system, the total modified percentages did not always total 100, 
containing rounding errors and responses corresponding to “other” category. 
 
Statistical analysis: We used SPSS 14.0 software and chi-square tests for statistical analysis. 
Because our primary purpose was to elicit and describe life scientists’ opinions, only minimal 




Academic degrees: Of the sixty-one participants, twenty-four held doctorates in medical science 
(twenty-two of the twenty-four PhD’s were also medical MD’s). Another twenty-one held 
doctorates in other branches of science. Eight participants held doctorates in pharmaceutical 
sciences, four in agriculture, two in psychology, and two in dental science. 
 
Academic societies: Among the respondents, 73 percent belonged to the Molecular Biology 
Society of Japan (日本分子生物学会), 39 percent to the Japanese Biochemical Society (日本
生化学会), 30 percent to the Japanese Neuroscience Society (日本神経科学学会), 25 percent 
to the Japanese Cancer Association (日本癌学会), 22 percent to the Japanese Society of 
Developmental Biologists (日本発生生物学会), 19 percent to the Japanese Society for 
Immunology (日本免疫学会), 14 percent to the Japanese Society for Cell Biology (日本細胞
生物学会), and 13 percent to the Pharmaceutical Society of Japan (日本薬学会). 
 
A. The relationship between society and research on mind and behavior 
(a) Benefits: Researchers’ responses regarding the positive effects of mind and behavior 
research are summarized in Figure 1. In response to a series of different formulations of the 
question, most respondents (85 percent) indicated that they considered life-science research on 
the mind and behavior to be useful when helping ordinary people to understand themselves. 
However, there were some respondents who had differing opinions (15%), including some who 
 did not consider this kind of research as useful for human society (5%). A few examples of 
replies follow:  
 
 (Yes.) Helpful. For example, if we regard “war” as a disease affecting the human 
mind, it’s possible that we can “cure” the disease. However, I do not think that 
our genes account for everything. 
 
 (Yes.) Difficult question. The knowledge can help each person to deepen their 
understanding of themselves. But I know that my point-of-view is not a common 
one in our society. 
 
(No.) I don’t think this kind of research is helpful for ordinary people. Scientific 
knowledge is in a different dimension to the daily lives of the general public. 
Well, in the long run, I believe that it is better for our society to have this sort of 
scientific knowledge—it presents the traits of our own species. There is no need 
to conceal this knowledge from our society. I think that this kind of scientific 
knowledge is far better than pseudoscience.  
 






(b) Social and ethical issues emerging from the study of the mind and behavior by the life 
sciences: When asked about the possible implications of research into the mind, more than half 
of the respondents (64 percent) stated that problems associated with such studies were becoming 
increasingly relevant to our society (Figure 2). Note that respondents often gave ambiguous 
answers: they had never thought seriously about these issues. 
Privacy and confidentiality were the most commonly mentioned issues (13 percent 
each): 
If information about an abnormality in a given gene mutation were to be used in a 
clinical diagnosis, precautions should be taken to avoid leaking any personal 
information. When it comes to the human mind, not only are hereditary factors 
highly influential, but so are environmental factors. In other words, genetic factors 
should not be regarded as absolute. 
 
Problems with mental function were also referred to (12 percent), and some 
respondents raised the issue of mind-altering drugs (7 percent).  
 
 Issues will crop up in the legal domain, philosophical ones such as to what degree 
a criminal can be blamed if he/she has a specific combination of genetic 
variations engendering an antisocial personality out of the range of any 
psychiatric disease.  
 
Some respondents were concerned about pseudoscientific notions about genetics (5 
percent) or genetic determinism (4 percent). Some also cited the effects of the 
commercialization of genetic testing (5 percent), noting the legal implications of genetic 
research. 
Asked about the broad social influence of life-science research on the mind and 
behavior, 23 percent of respondents anticipated significant changes in social systems. They 
predicted that the extent of these changes would largely depend on three factors: the degree of 
the research developments (7 percent), professionals who apply emerging technology to mental 
and behavioral issues in both the private and the public sectors (5 percent), and gene function 
brought about by the mind and behavior research (4 percent). NB: The questions mentioned 
“possible” rather than inevitable problems and implications. 
Some respondents did not believe that specific problems would arise from behavior 
and mind research (15 percent); more than 10 percent considered the upshot of research to be 
unpredictable.  
 
Thinking rationally about it, there aren’t any problems. It’s reasonable to suggest 
that no scientific finding has necessary social implications. If anything, I think it’s 
society’s fault. [. . .] We cannot run away from scientific facts. I believe that 
unless we face scientific facts rationally and make them a foundation for our 
thoughts, our world may become a sham, a fake. 
 
(c) Application of mind and behavior research to social policy: The relationship between mind 
and behavior research and society can be construed as a social policy issue. In our interviews, 
we asked for their opinions about applying their research to social policies. The responses were 
significantly divided, and they raised a wide range of issues. On one hand, more than 40 percent 
of respondents believed that the results of their research should not be applied to social policy 







 I’ve never thought about it. I am basically against such applications at present. I 
think our society is not ready to accept such applications. Also, social security is 
not enough. It should be mentioned, though, that it will be impossible to stop this 
kind of social application in the future.  
 
 [That would be a] terrible mistake! When we compare the innate and learned 
aspects of human personality, we find learned aspects far more important. Thus, we 
can modify human personality more effectively by changing the environment. So 
why should we regulate genetic behavioral traits through social policies, applying 
research from the study of mind and behavior? It’s far more risky than beneficial. It 
relies on an oversimplified view that everything can be explained by biology.  
 
I think it would be difficult. Personally, I do not want it applied to social policy, 
although I know the importance of what is called “prediction” of a specific, for 
example criminal, human tendency. 
 
Research related to the life sciences of mind and behavior does not easily fit into 
social policy. It is suited to the medical treatment of clinical conditions, not 
arbitrary decision-making. [. . .] It is a matter of what is normal and what is 
abnormal. I mean, when a condition exceeds its normal range, it is called a disease. 
It is not the business of biology to intervene when a case is within the normal 
range. 
 
However, about 30 percent of respondents did support applications to social policy—at 
least to some extent. Some claimed that life sciences of mind and behavior had already 
influenced social policy (5 percent), and 14 percent considered such an influence unavoidable.  
 
I agree with the ideas of such applications. Still, it is nonsense to place science 
above everything else. In the process of seeking out positive applications, it is 
important to take everyone’s opinions into account.  
 
Knowledge drawn from the life sciences of mind and behavior is effective when 
solving educational problems such as Japan’s “Nursing the Brain Project.” Our 
lives cannot be evaluated separately; we evaluate them as a whole, and we cannot 
 know what kind of life is happy until its end. For example, a good memory can be 
a great asset in economic matters. But in terms of other activities in our daily lives, 
I do not think an extremely good memory has any other advantages. It’s a difficult 
issue.  
 
It depends on the extent. [. . .] I think this kind of occupational difference involving 
genetic traits already exists. Various things become clear as time passes. We should 
also consider the range of personal information, although I know there are kinds of 
information that should be kept secret.  
 
Yes, but with limits. [. . .] Unlike the “average” story, I think it is difficult to deal 
with individual cases. In other words, I agree with the application of mind and 
behavior research to social policy when it becomes possible to take care of each 
individual trait.  
 
When talking about such applications, we should consider two dimensions. Few of 
the results from research into genetic variation as it relate to higher brain functions 
are applicable to public policy. We should also consider the problems related to 
personal information. In terms of social equality, our society should accept 
variations in human traits as long as it they fall within a socially acceptable range. 
[. . .] We should also consider how research results may get oversimplified as they 
spread widely. In such oversimplified versions, interactions between genetic 
factors and other environmental factors are neglected, which can contribute to 
prejudice. [. . .] I think that mind and behavior research results are useful only for a 
very limited number of case outside of clinical psychiatry. It may be helpful when 
conducting psychiatric evaluations. 
 
Respondents who offered predictions of emerging social implications generally tended 
to exhibit a positive attitude toward the representation of mind and behavior research in social 
policies (p = 0.022). 
Some respondents referred to communication problems, particularly between the life 
sciences and the humanities (Table 1). Almost 50 percent mentioned communication gaps. 
(Unfortunately many respondents were not able to respond to this question. Among those who 
did respond, only 6 percent said they had communicated with humanities researchers, 
 explaining that there had been no need for such discussions.) 
 
Yes, there are communication problems. For example, at present in Japan, and from 
the viewpoint of Kantism or eugenics, humanities researchers who are also members 
of the Science Council of Japan are persistently against ES (embryonic stem) cell 
research. Technical developments will change social attitudes, as was the case with 
blood transfusions. 
 
There are some communication gaps. Philosophers should learn more about biology. 
Why don’t they take a realistic look at our lives? 
 
I have never discussed ethical or social aspects of the life sciences of mind and 
behavior with humanities researchers. When such conversations do take place, we 
scientists should convey the significance of environmental factors. I know it’s 
difficult. I’m wondering about the extent to which philosophy reflects the opinions 
of the general public. If philosophers set forth their opinions as if they spoke for the 
general public, without ever checking anything, it makes the relationship between 
life-science researchers and philosophers difficult.  
 
In Europe and North America, there seems to be some kind of gap between 
life-science researchers and humanities scholars. But in Japan, there are few such 
cases. The life sciences may be similar to philosophy, epistemologically speaking. 
Simplification is the way of science, whereas it is philosophers who grasp a the 
world whole and unsimplified.  
 
I’ve never noticed this. I know some philosophers who have a good understanding 
of the life sciences. 
 
B. Genetic technologies that could affect human mental abilities  
(a) Basic attitudes: Figure 4 shows respondents’ opinions toward technological developments 
that have the potential to affect the genetic basis of human mental abilities. Their opinions 
varied dramatically. Almost 50 percent took a neutral stance, 20 percent were in favor, and 30 
percent were opposed. Note that each attitude (favorable, opposed and neutral) was chosen by 






 (Favorable.) We cannot say no, because we cannot stop the progress of science. 
I’m positive about it. Mental activities are based on substance. That is a fact, though 
I cannot believe that such material bases are the only basis of our mental 
phenomena. 
 
 (Favorable.) I agree, though I do not want to have that kind of operation. 
 
 (Favorable.) It is better for humans to have such technology. Deciding whether to 
apply such technologies to an individual must be decided case by case. 
 
 (Neutral.) I’m not negative about that kind of technology. [I’d] permit them if they 
can be developed, but there will be disagreements as to the ideal human form. 
Technological development is not necessarily bad, though it is difficult to decide 
which human traits are good and which are bad. 
 
 (Neutral.) Neither yes nor no. Anyway, the technologies will emerge whether or 
not we allow it. I think it is important to make them useful to human beings. 
 
  (Neutral.) Difficult question. There are some diseases for which such an operation 
is necessary. The problem is that existing model organisms—mice, for 
example—are inadequate for modeling every human situation. In developing such 
technologies, we must apply them directly to humans as well. [. . .] We must ask 
whether that kind of operation corresponds to a medical treatment. Is it acceptable to 
society? 
 
 (Opposed.) Scientists should not permit technologies to be developed with the aim 
of applying them to humans. For basic research using mice, there is no problem. But 
human applications are too dangerous. It is important to separate applications from 
the basic aspects of research problems. There is the possibility that someone could 
abuse this sort of technology if it were applied. I think that even if that kind of 
technology can be applied as a medical treatment, it should definitely be prohibited. 
 
 (Opposed.) [Any] intervention at the level of the germ line, even at a 
developmental level, I am definitely against.  
 
 (Opposed.) Even in low-level gene therapy, there remains a lot that is largely 
unknown. [. . .] The identification of a given gene and the control of a given gene 
are completely different things. [. . .] Take, for example, organ transplants: you 
never know the social merits or demerits until you try. The outcome depends on the 
maturity of the society. 
 
With respect to such genetic technologies, 29 percent of respondents deemed it 
necessary to regulate them, while almost 25 percent emphasized the importance of accumulating 
sufficient scientific knowledge to assess risks and benefits (Table 2). This included 13 percent of 
respondents, who mentioned that it would be important to have academic discussions comparing 
the risks and benefits of a given technology. Approximately 20 percent of respondents 
emphasized the value of society-wide discussions and consensus, and 15 percent recommended 
case-by-case decision-making. Respondents receptive to genetic interventions tended to mention 
that acquiring additional scientific knowledge was a necessary precondition (p = 0.022).  
 
(b) Acceptable and unacceptable genetic interventions into human mental abilities: Opinions 




intervening to improve mental acuity; 25 percent approved of intervening to raise the mental 
abilities of mentally challenged individuals from below average to average. Of these 
respondents, few explained their views clearly. In other words, the meanings of “average” and 
“normal” mental capacity were often not defined. Approximately 10 percent of respondents 
considered all genetic interventions into human mental activity to be inappropriate. Of the 25 
percent who considered interventions to achieve cognitive enhancements impermissible, almost 
all admitted that there were no clear-cut distinction between medical treatment and enhancement. 
Some respondents simply regarded the question as unanswerable. Significant concerns were 
raised about the effectiveness (26 percent), reversibility (16 percent), and safety (12 percent) of 
the interventions.  
  
 (Acceptable: Corresponding to medical treatments whose effectiveness is 
guaranteed.) Basically, disease treatment is all right. [. . .] We can consider that 
kind of treatment if we are certain it’s safe. 
 
 (Acceptable: Raising individual from below-average to average.) It is acceptable 
to raise someone’s mental level to an average level.  
 
  (Acceptable: Raising individual from below-average to average. Unacceptable: 
Enhancement.) The important question is to what degree we may intervene in 
human mental abilities. I think genetic treatment for patients with Down’s 
syndrome or Asperger’s syndrome should be allowed. [But] there is no need to 
treat normal people. 
 
 (Acceptable: Raising individual from below-average to average.) If we are 
talking about something like working-memory dysfunctions that hinder our daily 
lives, I think improving faulty functions is allowable. 
 
 (Acceptable: Within criteria established by social consensus.) That is a difficult 
question. The criteria should be determined through social discussions that 
involve life-science researchers. 
 
(Acceptable: In individual with criminal tendencies.) We should consider people 
in need. For example, a person who commits crimes again and again will need 
medical attention in the future. It is necessary to obtain public understanding of 
such treatments, though people never think about such kinds of issues, and of 
course they would say “no.”  
 
 (Unacceptable: All possible interventions unacceptable.) I’m completely 
opposed to irreversible genetic operations on humans.  
 
Regarding genetic interventions, several respondents raised issues they felt should be 
considered: 23 percent reported that it was difficult to distinguish between appropriate and 
inappropriate interventions; 13 percent pointed out the lack of a clear boundary between 
individual variations and disorders; approximately 20 percent emphasized the need to acquire 
more scientific knowledge; some expressed concerns about the negative effects of 
commercializing the relevant technology.  
Furthermore, when asked about genetic intervention into human mental activities, 15 
percent answered, “I don’t know”; 8 percent said that the question was not “realistic and 
answerable”; and some respondents (6 percent) gave answers that were classified as “other.” 
One question was: “Who should be empowered to make judgments with respect to such 
interventions?” Global consensus was necessary, said 14 percent of the respondents. An equal 
 number felt that national approval was necessary, while 7 percent spoke of “public” approval. 
Scientists should take the lead, said 2 percent, while judgments by medical staff (6 percent) and 







 4. Discussion 
This study examined the views of Japanese life-science researchers on ethical and social issues 
prompted by developments in the biological studies of mind and behavior. Our study highlights 
some controversial issues such as applying mind and behavior research to social policy, and we 
have noted disagreements regarding interventions to modify human cognitive abilities.  
The most significant result was the lack of any clear consensus regarding the 
implications of the life sciences of mind and behavior for social policy. Some researchers were 
sanguine about the potential contributions in this area, while others were cautious and less than 
hopeful. This kind of divide in researchers’ attitudes should be considered as individuals, 
institutions, and states assess the ethical and social implications of research, especially when 
discussing the application of controversial new technologies.  
The divergence may be closely linked to another finding. When discussing the 
distinction between gene therapy and the genetic enhancement of human mental ability (a good 
example of one of the controversial issues mentioned above), there was much disagreement. 
Defining an acceptable range of human mental ability beyond which intervention is acceptable 
proved extremely difficult, particularly when solutions were drawn from the life sciences alone.  
Should such therapy become a possibility, scholars and officials must go to great 
lengths to explain the subject clearly to general public; ignorance and confusion must be 
avoided, and broad discussions must be encouraged. 
Another point to keep in mind is the need for framing discussions in terms relevant to 
society at large. For example, the researchers we interviewed tended to use “deviations from the 
average” or “normality” to determine whether to approve of interventions. However, the value 
of “average” changes as a population evolves, and there are several different ways to define 
“normality” (Wachbroit 2006). The enhancement conundrum is not a new problem (Wolpe 
2002; Savulescu et al 2006). It is not merely seen as a scientific or philosophical issue—most 
recognize it as an important issue for human society. Previous authors have suggested that at a 
purely theoretical level it is difficult to delineate a logical and definitive distinction between 
enhancement and treatment (Baylis and Robert 2004; British Medical Association 2007; Caplan 
and Elliott 2004; Dickens 1996; Loftis 2005).  
The difficulty involved in eliciting firm solutions from the life sciences alone confirms 
the importance of broad discussions of such topics, as well as discussions among members of 
the scientific community. Our results indicate that as those discussions take place it would be 
insufficient to rely on a few leading researchers to make decisions. A number of researchers 
from various backgrounds are needed to clarify ambiguities and differences of opinion. 
 Moreover, researchers should be encouraged to participate fully in dialogues with members of 
the public. One example of an effective discussion process that has already taken place has been 
published as a discussion paper by the British Medical Association: “Boosting your brainpower: 
Ethical aspects of cognitive enhancements.” The goal of that paper was to “inform public debate 
about how, as a society, we should respond to these developments” (British Medical Association 
2007).  
Despite some methodological limitations, our study provides a baseline map of the 
general opinions held by Japanese life-science researchers about the ethical and social issues 
raised by recent developments in mind and behavioral science. We believe that our conclusions 
are not specific to Japan, and that our findings may represent a starting point for the 
international discussions that will be necessary to avoid undesirable social consequences of 
mind and behavior research.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the history of experimental research on the mind and 
behavior, particularly the eugenics movements, has shown just how grave the consequences of 
this branch of academia can be for society. At present, technologies that make it possible to 
intervene in the human mind are already widespread (one thinks of proactive drugs like Ritalin 
and Prozac), and others may be developed regardless of public awareness or concerns. This 
research is not risk-free. Although it is difficult to identify and anticipate all of the problems that 
may crop up, we must be aware of future possibilities and deal with them appropriately. One 
important step towards this goal is to acknowledge and address the diversity and abundance of 
current opinions among life-science researchers, especially when it concerns scientifically and 
socially ambiguous problems emerging from mind and behavior research. 
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